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ARGUMENT 
I. DFFs brief confuses Findings of Fact with Conclusions of Law. 
In its brief, DFI correctly states that the District Court's findings of fact cannot be 
reversed unless they are clearly erroneous. DFI implies that the one of the findings of fact 
subject to the clearly erroneous standard is the District Court's conclusion that "there's 
no reasonable basis to believe that these documents are anything other than frivolous, that 
they have been submitted to the court for ... the only reason [of delaying] these 
proceedings." (R 294:8). Given DFI's failure to submit a proposed order, it is uncertain 
whether the District Court made any findings of fact or conclusions of law other than the 
above statement. However, it is certain that the District Court's statement can only be 
classified as a conclusion of law, and must therefore be reviewed under the correction of 
error standard. 
A violation of Rule 11 occurs when an attorney or unrepresented party presents a 
document before the court that is for "any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay" or is not "warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new 
law." Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b) (2009). Accordingly, a district court may make findings of 
fact regarding the nature and circumstances of the document that was filed. However, the 
holdings that a document is frivolous or has been filed for the improper purpose of 
unnecessary delay are ultimate conclusions of law. Many pleadings that do not violate 
Rule 11 are unsupported by existing law or result in delay. In order to find a violation of 
Rule 11, the district court must go beyond the factual circumstance of the document and 
determine that the delay was unnecessary as a matter of law or that no "nonfrivolous 
argument" for filing the document can be found. 
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This distinction between conclusions of law and findings of fact is borne out by 
Utah case law. Thus, in Taylor v. Hansen, the district court the appellant's motion was 
"improper and groundless" and "wholly without any merit whatsoever in law or fact." 
Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 930 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). However, the Utah Court of 
Appeals found that the "the trial court's conclusion that Taylor violated Rule 11 is error." 
Id. (empasis added). Furthermore, the Court analyzed the conclusions at issue under the 
correction of error standard to determine that the motion was neither meritless nor 
objectively unreasonable under the circumstances." Id. Similarly, in Barnard v. Sutliff, 
the trial court determined that Barnard's knowledge of decisions by two other district 
courts was irrelevant and that the law regarding the issue in question was clear. Barnard 
v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, (Utah 1992). The Utah Supreme Court noted that "[b]ecause 
both of these grounds are, in effect, legal conclusions, we review them for correctness." 
Id And, on all fours with this case, in Griffith v. Griffith J 999 UT 78, ^ 10, 985 P.2d 
255 (Utah 1999), the district court's order contained a "factual finding" that: 
Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Defendant's Attorney filed on January 4, 
1996, was not well grounded in fact or warranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, 
and was filed for an improper purpose to harass Defendant and cause 
unnecessary delay and needless increase in the costs of litigation. 
The Utah Supreme Court concluded that "this purported factual finding, drafted as it was 
by counsel for the prevailing party, simply paraphrasing the language of rale 11, and 
standing by itself without any detailed factual findings particularizing its conclusions is 
insufficiently specific as a matter of law to support the imposition of rale 11 sanctions." 
Id. (emphasis added). The Court further explained that the "law requires that a trial court 
make a series of specific factual findings as a predicate for concluding that the rale has 
been violated, and then must determine the appropriate sanction ... [t]he trial court's 
findings and conclusions must reveal the court's reasoning clearly enough that an 
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appellate court can apply the appropriate standard of review to each part of the trial 
court's ruling." Id. 
In this case, although there do not appear to be any specific findings of fact in the 
record, the documents filed by Mr. Granados and their contents are undisputed. Instead, 
the District Court's conclusion of law, that the filing of the documents was frivolous and 
for the improper purpose of delay is being appealed. Contrary to DFFs assertions, that 
conclusion must be reviewed under a correction of error standard. 
II. The sanctions available under Rule 11(c) are only applicable if a violation of 
Rule 11(b) has occurred. 
Contrary to DFFs argument, the fact that a represented party may be sanctioned 
under Rule 11(c) does not imply that a represented party can violate Rule 11(b). The 
language of Rule 11(b) is clear: u[b]y presenting a pleading, written motion, or other 
paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), an attorney or 
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, 
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances," that the 
representations within the document meets the criteria specified in subsections (b)(1) 
through (b)(4). Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b) (2009) (emphasis added). In this case, GR 2 was a 
represented party and therefore, its conduct does not fall within the ambit of Rule 11(b). 
DFI argues that Rule 11(c) allows the court to "impose an appropriate sanction on 
any attorney, law firm, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for 
the violation" and therefore a represented party may be sanctioned even if it has not 
violated Rule 11(b). However, before it is applicable, Rule 11(c) first requires a violation 
of Rule 11(b) to have occurred. And DFI has provided no argument or explanation of 
how a violation of Rule 11(b) occurred when GR 2 was represented at the time the Nato 
Nation documents were filed and GR 2's attorney did not make the filing. See Agency of 
Natural Resources v. Lyndonville Savings Bank & Trust Co., 811 A.2d 1232 (Vt. 2001) 
7 
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("Rule 11 is the appropriate vehicle only if one seeks sanctions against an unrepresented 
party or a lawyer for a party ... Neither Rule 11 nor its safe harbor provision applies if 
the moving party is seeking sanctions against a represented litigant.") 
Utah courts have strictly construed the language of Rule 11(b) in determining 
whether a violation of the Rule has occurred. Thus, in Kaisermann Assoc. Inc. v. Town, 
977 P.2d 462, 463 (Utah 1999), the appellant attorney had obtained a writ of garnishment 
in violation of Utah law. However, at the time of the alleged violation, Rule 11 required 
that the attorney or party sign the document in question. Id at 464. Therefore, because 
the writ of garnishment had been signed by the court clerk, and not by the attorney, the 
Utah Supreme Court found that no violation of Rule 11 had occurred. Id. at 465. In this 
case, Rule 11(b) requires that an attorney or unrepresented party present a document to 
the court before a violation can occur. Because those circumstances do not exist with 
respect to Mr.Granados' filing of the Nato Nation documents, Rule 11 is simply not 
applicable to this case. 
Furthermore, DFFs argument that GR 2 can be sanctioned under Rule 11(b) 
because Mr. Granados was acting as its agent must also fail. Rule 11(b) requires the 
document in question to be presented by an attorney or an unrepresented party. It does 
not make an exception for filings by agents of represented parties. Nor does Utah law 
support DFI's assertion that agents of corporate litigants can properly file pleadings on 
behalf of their clients. See Tracy-Burke Associates v. Dept. of Employment Security, 
699 P.2d 687, 688 (Utah 1985) ("It has long been the law of this jurisdiction that a 
corporate litigant must be represented in court by a licensed attorney.") 
III. The expedited trial schedule does excuse the District Court's failure to enter 
an order to show cause, provide GR 2 with adequate notice of the Rule 11 
hearing, or provide GR2 with a reasonable opportunity to respond. 
DFI argues that GR 2 had adequate notice and opportunity to respond in light of 
8 
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the expedited nature of the proceeding. However, in order to initiate Rule 11 sanction 
sua sponte, "the court may enter an order describing the specific conduct that appears to 
violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it 
has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto." Utah R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(B) 
(2009). Furthermore, a court may only impose sanctions "[i]f, after notice and a 
reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has been 
violated." Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c) (2009) (emphasis added). DFI has failed 
to provide a reasonable explanation for why the existence of a trial date ten days later 
excused the District Court from compliance with the due process requirements of Rule 
11. 
First, the existence of a trial date ten days later should not have effected whether 
an order to show cause was entered by the court. The requirement that the court enter an 
order to show cause was added to Rule 11 because a party is not shielded by the 21-day 
"safe harbor" period when a court initiates Rule 11 sanctions sua sponte. See Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendments; Thornton 
v. General Motors Corp., 136 F.3d 450, 451 (5th Cir. 1998); L.B. Foster Co. v. America 
Piles, Inc., 138 F.3d 81, 89 (2nd Cir. 1998) ('[i]f the sanctions are to be imposed sua 
sponte [under Rule 11], the court must proceed by order to show cause"). Thus, in 
Poulsen v. Freer, 946 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the Utah Court of Appeals 
noted that u[w]hen a court imposes sanctions sua sponte, due process requirements are 
met if the court issues an order to show cause ... and allows the party a reasonable time 
in which to file a response." While the trial in the matter may have been scheduled 
within ten days of the date the Nato Nation documents were filed, DFI has failed to 
provide any argument why the District Court did not have the time to enter an order to 
show cause prior to the hearing. Certainly the District Court had sufficient time to 
schedule a review hearing on December 8, 2008, in which it stated that it would hold a 
Rule 11 sanction hearing the very next day. Moreover, the District Court did not inform 
9 
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GR 2's counsel that he should be prepared to respond on GR 2's behalf at the Rule 11 
hearing. Instead, the district court told Mr. Jeffs that he would be allowed to withdraw 
as counsel at the end of the hearing, instructed Mr. Jeffs to inform GR 2 of the hearing 
through an off-record letter, and stated "that if [GR 2] wants to be heard [it will] need to 
bring a lawyer." (R 293:5-7). As a result, GR 2 only received notice of the Rule 11 
hearing in the late evening and was unable to retain new counsel on the morning before 
the hearing. Given the timing and nature of the notice GR 2 received, it was clearly not 
afforded sufficient notice to adequately respond at the Rule 11 hearing. 
Similarly, DFI has failed to adequately explain why the Rule 11 hearing needed to 
be held the day after the Nato Nation documents were filed. The District Court had ten 
days before the trial in the matter was scheduled. It could have scheduled the Rule 11 
hearing at any time within those ten days and thus provided GR 2 with greater notice and 
more time to prepare a response. DFI argues that holding the hearing closer to the trial 
date would have resulted in it expending time and resources in trial preparation. 
However, procedural fairness must always take precedence over the convenience of one 
of the parties. At the time the Rule 11 hearing was scheduled, it was possible for the 
District Court to have found that GR 2 was not in violation of Rule 11 or to have imposed 
lesser sanctions. Furthermore, the District Court could have balanced procedural fairness 
with DFI's expenses by scheduling the hearing at a later date and ordering GR 2 to pay 
DFI's attorneys' fees for trial preparation. Instead, the District Court gave GR 2 less than 
a day's notice of the hearing and, in effect, told GR 2's lawyer that he would not have to 
respond on its behalf at the hearing. 
In addition, GR 2 was clearly denied an opportunity to respond at the hearing. 
Although Mr. Jeffs initially appeared for GR 2, the district court did not ask him to 
respond to the Rule 11 allegations on behalf of GR 2. Instead, it instructed Mr. Jeffs to 
take a seat and instructed Mr. Granados to come up to the counsel table. (R. 294:1-2). 
Then, after verifying that Mr. Granados had filed the Nato Nation documents, the district 
10 
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court summarily concluded that it had reviewed the Nato Nation documents "and found 
that their legal contentions are not warranted by existing law and are in fact frivolous, and 
that the allegations in them a, don't have evidentiary support." (R 294:3-4). The District 
Court only allowed Mr. Granados to speak after it had already announced its ruling. 
(R.294:4). And, as established by long standing Utah law, Mr. Granados is not permitted 
to represent GR 2 in court proceedings. See Tracy-Burke Associates, 699 P.2d 687, 688 
(Utah 1985). As a result, GR 2 was denied any opportunity to respond prior to the 
District Court reaching its decision. 
IV. The District Court failed to enter sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of 
law to support its order. 
DFI claims that the record contains ample findings of fact and conclusions of law 
in support of the District Court's order. However, just as DFI failed to submit to the 
District Court a proposed Order with findings of fact and conclusions of law, DFI has 
failed to marshal the findings of fact and conclusions of law that it claims are in the 
record. "[A] trial court is required to make explicit findings of fact in support of its legal 
conclusions." See Willey v. Willev, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997). Moreover, the Utah 
Supreme Court has found this "particularly necessary in the rule 11 area." Griffith, 1999 
UT 78 at Tf 10. "The law requires that a trial court make a series of specific factual 
findings as a predicate for concluding that the rule has been violated, and then must 
determine the appropriate sanction ... The trial court's findings and conclusions must 
reveal the court's reasoning clearly enough that an appellate court can apply the 
appropriate standard of review to each part of the trial court's ruling." Id. In this case, 
the written record and the transcripts of the hearing are unclear as to which statements by 
the district court constituted formal findings of fact and conclusions of law. As a result, 
the District Court has not made sufficient findings of facts and conclusions of law to 
support its order. 
l l Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
V. DFI has not addressed whether the filing of the Nato Nation documents, 
irrespective of who filed it, constituted a violation of Rule 11. 
In Section IV of its Appeal Brief, GR 2 argued that even if Rule 11 applied to the 
conduct of Mr. Granados, the filing of the Nato Nation documents did not result in a 
violation of Rule 11. Specifically, GR 2 argued that no violation could have occurred 
because there is no Utah case law prohibiting the filing of documents from the tribal 
courts of Native American tribes not recognized by the U.S department of Interior, and 
no clear case law on the issue from other jurisdictions. DFFs brief does not address this 
issue. 
VI. Entry of a default judgment was not an appropriate sanction under Rule 11 
or the facts of this case. 
DFI acknowledges that there is no Utah case law authorizing the imposition of a 
default judgment as a sanction for violating Rule 11. DFI further acknowledges that the 
normal sanction for a Rule 11 sanction is recovery of attorneys' fees. See Bailley-Allen 
Co. Jnc. v. Kurzet 945 P.2d 180, 194 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Indeed the plain language of 
Rule 11 states that "[a] sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what 
is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly 
situated ... the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an 
order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective 
deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable 
attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation." Utah R. of 
Civ. Pr. 11(c)(2) (2009) (emphasis added). Thus the language of the Rule 11 appears to 
clearly distinguish between directives of a nonmonetary nature as opposed to orders to 
pay a penalty. 
Instead, DFI argues that the sanction of a default judgment is authorized because it 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
has been adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See Jiminez v. 
Madison Area Technical College, 321 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2003). However, even if this 
Court was to find these cases persuasive, it is clear that only a minority of jurisdictions 
have interpreted Rule 11 as permitting the ultimate sanction of dismissal. Indeed, while 
DFI cites to the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure as supporting dismissal as a sanction, even the Advisory Committee Notes are 
limit sanctions to "dismissal of a claim, preclusion of a defense, or preparation of an 
amended pleading." Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendments to Rule 11 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. DFI has provided no other argument for why Utah 
should adopt an interpretation of Rule 11 that places it within the minority of 
jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, even those jurisdictions that have adopted the sanction of dismissal 
only apply it in the most extreme of circumstances. Thus, in Jiminez, the sanctioned 
party had provided falsified documents in order to bolster her claim. 321 F.3d 656. Thus 
the court of appeals noted that the sanction of dismissal was appropriate given that the 
sanctioned party's "claim was so unmeritorious and her behavior so deceptive that the 
filing of her baseless claim amounted to a veritable attack on our system of justice." L± 
at 657. Indeed, in the Seventh Circuit, "it is well settled ... that the ultimate sanction of 
dismissal should be involved only in extreme situations, when there is a clear record of 
delay or contumacious conduct, or when other less drastic sanctions have proven 
unavailable." Rice v. City of Chicago, 333 F.3d 780, 786 (7th Cir. 2003) (quotations 
omitted) (reversing sanction of dismissal where plaintiff had been tardy in complying 
with court orders). Similarly, in the context of Rule 37 sanctions in Utah, the sanction of 
dismissal has only been imposed for egregious violations. See Hales v. Oldroyd, 2000 UT 
75, 999 P.2d 588, 595 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (affirming dismissal based on ample 
evidence of multiple delays and failures to respond to discovery requests and court 
orders); UDOT v. Osguthorpe. 892 P.2d 4, 8 (Utah 1995) (finding more than adequate 
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evidence that Osguthorpe willfully failed to respond to the court order compelling 
discovery). 
However, in this case, DFI has failed to explain why GR 2's filing of the Nato 
Nation documents was so egregious and contumacious that it amounted to "a vertaible 
attack on out system of justice." In fact, DFI has not even responded to GR 2's argument 
that the filing of documents from an unrecognized tribe is not a violation of Rule 11. 
Similarly, DFI has failed to explain why a lesser sanction, such as the imposition of a 
monetary penalty, would not have deterred similar conduct in the future. 
Moreover, DFI's argument that the District Court had the inherent contempt 
authority to enter the sanction of dismissal is inapplicable to the facts of this case. At the 
hearing, the District Court clearly indicated that it was sanctioning GR 2 pursuant to Rule 
11. Specifically, the District Court stated that "[b]ased upon that finding that under Rule 
11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure I'm going to strike your answer and counterclaim 
and enter a default against you." (R 294:8). As a result, DFI cannot rely on the District 
Court's inherent authority to sanction contempt to justify a dismissal entered pursuant to 
Rule 11. Indeed, even under a court's contempt authority, it may only do so "if the party 
engages in conduct designed to improperly influence the court's decision on the merits of 
the case, such as perjury or obstruction or justice, or if the conduct itself tends to 
demonstrate bad faith or a lack of merit." Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68,143, 123 P.3d 
416 (Utah 2005). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that the District Court's 
December 9, 2008, Order and Judgment be reversed and the case be remanded to the 
District Court. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of September, 2009. 
NadesanBeck P.C. 
O^ 
anhik Nadesan 
Attorney for GR 2 Enterprises LLC 
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